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Abstract
In many countries around the world, consumers leave voluntary payments of money (called “tips”) to service
workers who have served them. Since tips are an expense that consumers are free to avoid, tipping is an
anomalous behavior that many economists regard as “irrational” or “mysterious.” In this paper, I present a
motivational framework that offers plausible explanations for: (1) why people tip, (2) how tipping norms
came into existence and evolve over time, (3) why tipping varies across individuals and situations, (4) why
tipping is more common for some occupations than others, and (5) why tipping varies across nations. Many
hypotheses generated from this framework are supported by existing research, but many other implications of
the framework have yet to be adequately tested. Thus, the framework provides a promising and much needed
theoretical guide for future research on a fascinating consumer behavior.
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In many countries around the world, consumers leave voluntary payments of 
money (called “tips”) to service workers who have served them. Since tips are an expense 
that consumers are free to avoid, tipping is an anomalous behavior that many economists 
regard as “irrational” or “mysterious.” In this paper, I present a motivational framework 
that offers plausible explanations for: (1) why people tip, (2) how tipping norms came 
into existence and evolve over time, (3) why tipping varies across individuals and 
situations, (4) why tipping is more common for some occupations than others, and (5) 
why tipping varies across nations.  Many hypotheses generated from this framework are 
supported by existing research, but many other implications of the framework have yet to 
be adequately tested. Thus, the framework provides a promising and much needed 
theoretical guide for future research on a fascinating consumer behavior. 
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Service Gratuities and Tipping:  
A Motivational Framework  
 
1. Introduction 
“Economists do not have a good theory of tipping. Normally, we assume 
that consumers pay as little as they have to when buying the products they 
want. Yet, when buying meals, haircuts and taxi services, most consumers 
voluntarily pay more than they are legally required. Why does this 
happen? Why is it more true for some services than for others? Why do 
tipping customs vary from country to country? I have no idea.” 
     -- Greg Mankiw (2007)  
 In many countries around the world, consumers leave voluntary payments of 
money (called “tips”) to service workers who have served them. Although the size of 
these payments varies across nations, sub-cultural groups, individuals, service 
occupations, and particular service encounters, they often represent non-trivial sums of 
money. For example, tipping often increases the costs of eating out at restaurants by 10 to 
20 percent and that of taxicab rides by 10 to 15 percent (Lynn and Lynn, 2004). 
Collectively, tips represent a substantial expenditure of economic resources with 
estimates placing the total amounts tipped to restaurant workers in the United States 
alone at around $44 billion (Azar, 2008). 
 This widespread and substantial form of payment is interesting because it is an 
expense that consumer are free to avoid. Typically, consumers try to pay as little as 
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possible for the things they buy, so tipping is an anomalous behavior that many 
economists regard as “irrational” or “mysterious” (e.g., Ben Zion and Karni, 1977; Frank, 
1987; Landsburg, 1993). Although there is a modest and growing academic literature 
examining tipping, this work tends to be narrow in scope and poorly integrated (see 
Lynn, 2006, and Azar, 2007, for reviews). There is no good theory or framework that can 
be used to (1) integrate the tipping literature, (2) explain historical, individual, situational, 
occupational and national variations in tipping, and (3) direct future research on the 
phenomenon. This paper is intended to fill that gap.  
 Drawing upon the existing behavioral science theory and research as well as the 
tipping literature, I identify five motives for tipping and two for not tipping, which I refer 
to collectively as the tipping motives framework (TMF). Then I use the TMF to explain 
differences in tipping across historical time, individuals, situations, occupations, and 
nations. In the process of doing so, I  review the tipping literature to see how well 
supported those explanations are as well as how useful the TMF is for understanding 
various aspects of the phenomena and for directing future research. I conclude the paper 
with a summary evaluation of the TMF and a call for more research using it to understand 
the determinants of this fascinating economic behavior. 
2. The Tipping Motives Framework 
 Tipping is the voluntary and deliberate act of individual consumers. Therefore, its 
ultimate explanation lies in individual human motivation. Clearly, cognitive and social 
processes also underlie tipping, but they operate on and/or through motives and their 
effects cannot be fully understood apart from some motivation for tipping. Indeed a 
perusal of the tipping literature reveals a number of different motives that have been 
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hypothesized to underlie this behavior (see Azar, 2010; Becker, Bradley & Zantow, 2012; 
Lynn, 2009; Lynn & Grassman, 1990; Regner, 2014; Saunders & Lynn, 2010; Whaley, 
Douglas & O’Neill, 2014). Selectively drawing on this literature, I argue that tipping is 
primarily driven by motivations to: (1) help servers, (2) reward service, (3) gain or 
maintain future preferential service, (4) gain or maintain social esteem (approval, status, 
and/or liking), and (5) fulfill felt obligations and duties.  Countering these positive 
motivations for tipping are two primary restraining motivations – (1) a desire to keep the 
tip money for other uses, and (2) a dislike of the status differences implied and created by 
tipping. Collectively, these motivations for and against tipping make-up what I call the 
Tipping Motives Framework or TMF, which is graphically depicted in Figure 1. Support 
for the existence and importance of these theorized motives is drawn from the behavioral 
and experimental economics literature as well as the theory and research of other social 
science disciplines in the paragraphs below. Subsequent sections apply this framework to 
different aspects of the phenomena – namely temporal/historical, individual, situational, 
occupational, and national differences in tipping. 
__________________________________ 
insert Figure 1 about here 
__________________________________ 
2.1. Helping Servers 
 Numerous scholars have suggested that tippers are motivated by desires to help 
their servers (e.g., Azar, 2004a; Frank, 1988; Saunders & Lynn, 2010; Schotter, 1979) 
and roughly seventy percent of U.S. consumers agree that such desires underlie their own 
tipping (Lynn, 2009). Although inconsistent with economic models that assume self-
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interest as the primary human motivation, this altruistic motivation for tipping is 
consistent with theory and research on mirror neurons, empathy, and helping behavior. 
Biologists and psychologists have found that observing others engage in an action or 
expressing an emotion automatically and unconsciously activates the neurons involved in 
completing that action or feeling that emotion.  Such a hard-wired perception-action 
mechanism contributes to the capacities and tendencies of humans and other primates to 
take another’s perspective and feel empathy for them, which in turn have been shown to 
increase helping behavior (deWaal, 2008; Iacoboni, 2009).  
 The idea that tippers care about helping servers is also consistent with economic 
research on dictator games. This research has found that a substantial minority of people, 
when asked to divide a windfall sum of money between themselves and a stranger in any 
way they like, give some money to the stranger even when their decisions are completely 
anonymous (Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, 1996; Johanneson & Persson, 2000). 
Furthermore, this research has found that allocator contributions increase under 
conditions likely to enhance empathy – i.e., when the recipient is identified ahead of the 
allocation decision (Small & Loewenstein, 2003), named or pictured (Burnham, 
2003;Charness & Gneezy, 2008), more needing or deserving of help (Branas-Garza, 
2006) and able to communicate with the allocator (Andreoni & Rao, 2011).   
 One issue that has arisen in both the economics and psychology literatures 
concerns the extent to which empathic and other-regarding behavior is motivated by the 
other’s welfare on the one hand or by a “warm glow,” “negative-state relief,” or other 
internal, psychic benefit of offering aid on the other hand (Andreoni, 1989; Batson & 
Shaw, 1991). However, the distinctions between these two classes of motives are subtle 
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and it is difficult if not impossible to empirically differentiate them (Krebs, 1991; 
Wallach & Wallach, 1991). So while I accept the possible existence of both forms of 
motivation, the TMF subsumes them both under the general motive to help servers.  
2.2. Rewarding Service 
 Tipping norms generally specify that tips are supposed to be a reward for service 
and approximately eighty percent of U.S. consumers report that the desire to reward good 
service does drive their own tipping behavior (Lynn, 2009). Thus, it is not surprising that 
scholars have identified a desire to reward workers for their services as one potential 
motive for tipping (e.g., Azar, 2007b; Lynn & Grassman, 1990; Saunders & Lynn, 2010). 
Such a motivation is consistent with theory and research on reciprocity and equity theory.  
Economists, psychologists and sociologists have found evidence of a universal 
reciprocity norm obligating people to repay the favors others do for them (Falk & 
Fishbacher, 2006; Fehr & Gachter, 2000). This norm is often internalized and operates 
even under conditions of anonymity where social approval and other strategic motives are 
not in play (Burger, Sanchez, Imberi & Grande, 2009). Related to the reciprocity norm is 
equity theory, which posits that people feel distress when the benefits they get and give in 
their relationships with others are not proportional to one another (Adams, 1965). 
Research on this theory has found that in many different contexts, the desire to avoid the 
psychological distress brought on by inequitable exchanges leads many people to give 
more to others the more those others have given them (Walster, et. al., 1973). These 
literatures suggest that tipping may be a way to maintain equitable relationships with 




2.3. Buying Future Service  
From a neo-classical economic perspective, the only rational motive for tipping is 
to insure future service (Ben-Zion & Karni, 1977) and approximately sixty percent of 
U.S. consumers in one survey acknowledged this motive as underlying their own tipping 
(Lynn, 2009).  Depending on their assumptions about servers’ motivations, scholars have 
argued that regular patrons can get better service on future service occasions by: (i) 
tipping contingent on service and thereby motivating servers who are aware of the 
contingency and desirous of larger tips (Azar, 2007a; Ben-Zion & Karni, 1977; Lynn & 
Grassman, 1990), or (ii) tipping generously and thereby obligating the server to 
reciprocate with better service in the future (Lynn, 2006; Shamir, 1984).   
The TMF incorporates the idea that tippers are motivated by a desire to buy better 
service on future service encounters but refines it in important ways. These refinements 
stem from the observation that tipped servers usually serve more than one customer, so 
that customers compete for the time and attention of service workers. Even when service 
is delivered to one customer at a time (as with haircuts), there are often multiple 
customers waiting for their turn to be served and service workers may rush service to one 
customer in order to get to another one or may lavish more time and attention on one 
customer thereby forcing the others to wait longer. This observation suggests that future 
service is a positional good and that giving better service to some customers typically 
reduces other customers’ service to at least some degree. Thus, the TMF posits that 
tippers seeking to buy better future service are actually seeking preferential service and 
that non-tippers whose service is diminished by the attention and time devoted to tippers 
may become motivated to begin tipping in order to retain the service levels to which they 
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are accustomed. Thus, there are two related but distinct future service motives for tipping 
– one to gain preferential service and another to avoid the loss of accustomed service 
levels.  
2.4. Buying Social Esteem  
 Although fewer than thirty percent of U.S. consumers acknowledge that desires 
for social approval, status, and/or liking underlie their own tipping (Lynn, 2009), many 
scholars believe that these desires are, in fact, major motivations for tipping (e.g., Azar, 
2004b; Lynn, 2006; Ruffle, 1999). Certainly, such a motivation for tipping is consistent 
with theory and research on the need to belong, impression management, and status 
seeking. In general, empirical work on these topics in marketing, psychology, sociology 
and economics indicates that people care about the opinions others have of them both 
because of the extrinsic, tangible rewards and the intrinsic, intangible (or psychic) 
rewards that come from being admired, liked and trusted (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; 
Engel, 2011; Vigneron and Johnson, 1999).  Furthermore, the idea that consumers may 
use tipping as a way to get these social esteem rewards is consistent with research on 
charitable giving and on economic games finding that people use gifts of money as a way 
to manage the impressions they make on others (see Ariely, Bracha and Meier, 2009; 
Soetevent, 2005).   
 Social psychologists have identified two basic self-presentational goals or 
motives, which, though positively correlated, have some unique antecedents and 
consequences – i.e., acquisitive motives that drive people to seek greater social approval 
and/or status and protective motives that drive people to avoid loss of the same (Arkin, 
1981; Schutz, 1998). Building and expanding on this work, the TMF recognizes two 
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distinct types of self-presentational motives for tipping - (i) desires to acquire the 
admiration, approval, and/or liking of others, and (ii) desires to avoid loss of the 
preceding positive social benefits.  
2.5. Sense of Duty or Obligation to Tip 
 Many scholars have argued that tipping is motivated by the feelings of pride and 
guilt that accompany tipping and not tipping respectively (e.g., Azar, 2004b; Lynn, 2006; 
Ruffle, 1999). Consistent with this idea, approximately twenty percent of U.S. consumers 
say they tip to avoid feelings of guilt and fifty percent say they tip to feel satisfaction 
from doing what is right (Lynn, 2009).  Such feelings of pride and guilt reflect a sense of 
duty or obligation to tip that stems from the internalization of tipping norms. 
Psychologists and sociologists have theorized and empirically demonstrated that 
processes of social learning and social identification often lead people to accept the 
appropriateness and legitimacy of social norms and to feel pride when complying with 
those norms and/or feel guilt and shame when violating them (Abell & Gecas, 1997; 
Richters & Waters, 1991). These internal rewards and sanctions motivate compliance 
with social norms even in the absence of external rewards and sanctions (Horne, 2003; 
Kerr, Garst, Lewandowski & Harris, 1997). Although inconsistent with neoclassical 
economic theory, the idea that internalized norms form part of people’s utility functions 
has been accepted and used in recent economic models by behavioral economics and 
socio-economic scholars (see Grossman, 2002; Levitt & List, 2007). 
 As used in the TMF, references to duty and/or obligation to tip refer only to the 
internalization of specific tipping norms and not to the internalization of more general 
social norms that might have implications for tipping.  Internalized social norms of a 
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general nature that are relevant to tipping are incorporated into the framework as separate 
motives. Specifically, although a sense of duty or obligation to tip could stem from an 
internalized norm of reciprocity as previously discussed, the TMF treats desires to 
reciprocate as a separate motivation. Thus, a sense of duty or obligation to tip as used in 
this framework arises only after the development and internalization of explicit tipping 
norms.  
2.6. Save Money 
 Rational people should want to pay as little as possible for things in order to save 
money for other uses. Thus, the idea that this desire impedes or constrains tipping is 
consistent with neo-classical economic models of man. Indeed, it is this desire to save 
money for other uses that makes tipping, a payment that consumers are free to avoid, 
seem irrational to economists (Ben-Zion & Karni, 1977). The TMF explains this apparent 
irrationality not by denying consumers’ obvious desires to save money, but by identifying 
other, non-traditional, and often psychic, goods that can purchased through tipping and 
that consumers value more than the other uses to which the money can be put.  This 
means that cost considerations are theorized to affect tipping just as they affect other 
purchases and expenditures of money. 
2.7. Treat Others as Equals 
 Several writers have observed that tipping gives consumers status and power over 
servers and thereby marks the latter group as inferior (Hemenway, 1984; Lynn, Zinkhan 
& Harris, 1993; Shamir, 1984). These status and power implications of tipping are 
inconsistent with egalitarian beliefs and values. Although far from universal, egalitarian 
beliefs and values are widely held. Political scientists and economists have found that 
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behavior in various laboratory games, such as the prisoners’ dilemma game, public goods 
games and the trust game, often reveals a preference for more egalitarian or equal 
outcomes over less egalitarian but more self-enhancing outcomes among a substantial 
number of players (Dawes, et. al., 2007; Xiao & Bicchieri, 2010). Furthermore, 
psychologists and sociologist have found that individual and national differences in 
general egalitarian beliefs predict a variety of social attitudes and behaviors (Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994; Schwartz, 2006). Since tipping gives customers 
power over servers and puts servers in what many regard as the demeaning position of 
having to depend on others’ generosity for their livelihoods, the TMF posits that 
egalitarian beliefs, values and considerations constrain tipping. 
 
3. The Evolution of Tipping Behavior, Motives and Norms over Time 
 Tipping is normative behavior, but tipping behaviors and the norms governing 
them are neither omnipresent nor static. For example, tipping did not become really 
common in the United States until the early 1900’s and the standard restaurant tip amount 
in the U.S. has risen from 10 percent of the bill in in the early 1900’s to 20 percent of the 
bill or more today (Seagrave, 1998). Tipping norms are not imposed by a central 
authority, so they must evolve out of the behavior of individual consumers and tippers. 
The TMF provides a foundation for thinking about what that evolutionary process might 
entail and can be used to generate testable hypotheses about the process as explained 






insert Table 1 about here 
__________________________________ 
Among the motivations for tipping posited by the TMF are several that exist 
independently of tipping norms or other people leaving tips. Specifically, tipping can help 
servers, reward good service, display wealth and generosity (i.e., increase social status), 
and buy preferential future service even when no one else leaves tips. Thus, these are 
likely to be the earliest motivations for tipping. Other motives for tipping posited by the 
TMF depend on other people leaving tips, though not necessarily on explicit tipping 
norms. Specifically, tipping is necessary to avoid the loss of social status and/or 
accustomed service levels only if other people’s tips are causing servers to admire, like, 
and serve their tipping customers better than their non-tipping customers. Thus, these 
loss-aversion motivations are likely to emerge only after tipping has begun for other 
reasons. Finally, the felt-obligation or duty motivation for tipping posited by the TMF 
depends on the existence of explicit injunctive tipping norms that have been internalized. 
Thus, it is likely to emerge only after tipping is widespread and non-tippers are seen as 
deviant and deserving of disapprobation.  
The differences among tipping motives described above can be used to generate a 
plausible theory about the origin and evolution of tipping norms that goes as follows. 
Tipping begins as an attempt by some people to help servers, reward good service, 
increase social status, and/or secure preferential future service. Once a few people begin 
to tip, they serve as models that similarly motivated others begin to copy. These early 
tippers create negative externalities for others who must then begin tipping to avoid 
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losses of service and server esteem. This loss avoidant motivation for tipping grows with 
the number of tippers in a positive feedback loop and can result in enough people tipping 
that non-tippers are seen as deviant and are looked down upon. Eventually, this public 
sentiment against non-tippers is codified in explicit injunctive tipping norms, which at 
least some consumers internalize and self-enforce.  
In addition to suggesting a theory about the origin of tipping norms, the TMF 
suggests at least one process by which normative tip amounts can change over time. This 
is true because two of the key benefits of tipping posited by the TMF – preferential 
service and social esteem – are positional in nature. Gaining preferential service and/or 
social esteem through tipping requires leaving larger-than-normal tips while avoiding the 
loss of accustomed service levels and/or social esteem requires leaving tips that are close 
to average (see Azar, 2004b; Shah & Higgins, 1997). If enough tippers are competing to 
gain preferential service and/or social esteem, they will exert an upward pressure on 
average tip amounts that everyone else must follow in order to avoid losses of service 
and/or esteem.  Thus, the TMF predicts and explains increasing normative tip amounts 
over time. 
Although Azar (2004a, 2004b) offers some historical information consistent with 
the ideas above, it is merely anecdotal. Hopefully, these ideas about the evolution of 
tipping behavior, motives and norms will be tested by more systematic historical analyses 
of writing about tipping in the popular press, etiquette books, and other sources. 
However, such historical analyses are not necessary to test some of the causal processes 
theorized to unfold over time. Occupations differing the frequency of being tipped offer a 
cross-sectional window into some of those processes. In particular, examining the 
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motives for tipping across occupations differing in the frequency of being tipped can be 
used to test the ideas that: (i) desires to help servers, reward good service, increase social 
status, and secure preferential future service are independent of others’ tipping, (ii) 
concerns about avoiding loss of status and service arise only after people begin tipping 
and increase with the number of tippers, and (iii) duty motives affect tipping only after 
the establishment of strong injunctive tipping norms. Such research is not yet available, 
but hopefully the TMF will encourage future researchers to fill that void. 
 
4. Individual and Situational Determinants of Tipping 
 Tip amounts vary widely across tippers and tipping situations. For example, 
individual U.S. restaurant tips often range from 0 to 40 percent or more of the bill (Lynn, 
Jabbour & Kim, 2012; Lynn & Thomas-Haysbert, 2003). The TMF offers a plausible 
explanation for much of this variation and leads to testable expectations about the effects 
on tipping of many individual and situational variables (see Table 2). Research assessing 
the effects of these variables is reviewed below in a preliminary assessment of the 
framework’s explanatory power and potential for guiding future research. Note that the 
research reviewed below largely deals with restaurant tipping, but only because most of 
the existing research on tipping has been conducted in a restaurant context (see Lynn, 
2006). This predominance of restaurant tipping research, does not reflect any intended 
limitation of the TMF’s applicability.  Although the relative explanatory power of the 
different motives in the TMF may vary across contexts, the framework as a whole should 





insert Table 2 about here 
__________________________________ 
 
3.1. Help Servers 
 If a desire to help servers motivates people to tip more than they otherwise would, 
then factors increasing the salience and/or importance of helping motives should increase 
tips. Consistent with this expectation, studies have found that individual differences in 
people’s espoused desire to help others are positively related to the amounts those people 
report tipping (Saunders & Lynn, 2010). In addition, several factors that should increase 
consumers’ empathy with servers have been found to increase the tip amounts consumers 
leave. Among those empathy and tip enhancing factors are the following: 
1) customer patronage frequency at the restaurant and, therefore, familiarity with the 
server (Conlin, Lynn & O’Donoghue, 2003; Lynn & McCall, 2000a), 
2) customer experience working for tips (Lynn, Jabbour & Kim, 2012; Parrett, 2011), 
3) customer knowledge of the server’s name (Garrity & Degelman, 1990), and 
4) physical proximity of the server to the customer (Jacob & Gueguen, 2012; Leodoro & 
Lynn, 2007; Lynn, Le & Sherwyn, 1998). 
Of course, these empathy enhancing factors could also affect consumer concern with the 
servers’ approval/liking, so they provide supportive but not definitive evidence that 
altruistic motives underlie tipping. Certainly, one potentially useful direction for future 




Perhaps the most compelling evidence that altruistic motives underlie tipping is 
provided in a series of papers by Nicholas Gueguen and his colleagues. Listening to 
songs with pro-social lyrics has been shown to increase helping thru its enhancement of 
empathy (Greitemeyer, 2009) and priming the concept of love by exposure to the words 
“Saint Valentine” as opposed to “Saint Martin” has been shown to increase helping 
behavior (Lamy, Fischer-Lokou & Gueguen,  2010).  Gueguen and colleagues 
conceptually replicated these effects in the context of restaurant tipping. In one study, 
they found that playing songs with pro-social lyrics (as opposed to the usual background 
music or to songs with neutral lyrics) in a restaurant in France increased both the 
frequency of customer tipping and the amounts left by those who tipped (Jacob, Gueguen 
and Boulbry, 2010). In another study, they found that printing an altruistic quotation (as 
opposed to a non-altruistic quotation or no quotation at all) on the checks at two 
restaurants in France had effects similar to those of playing music with pro-social lyrics 
(Jacob, Gueguen, Ardiccioni and Senemeaud, 2013). In a third study, Gueguen (2013) 
found that priming the concept of love by giving restaurant customers in France the bill 
on a heart shaped dish (as opposed to a round or square shaped dish) increased the 
likelihood they would leave a tip and the amounts left by those who did tip. It is difficult 
to explain these findings if people do not tip to help servers. 
3.2. Reward for Service 
If people tip to reward servers for their service performances and efforts, then tip 
amounts should be positively related to service quantity and quality. Consistent with this 
expectation, researchers have found that tips increase with the speed of pizza delivery 
(Kerr & Domazlicky, 2009), the number of in-room service activities performed by hotel 
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bellmen (Lynn & Gregor, 2001), the number of trips a restaurant server makes to the 
table (Lynn & McCall, 2000b), and customers’ evaluations of the quality of service 
provided by car guards (Saunders & Lynn, 2010) and restaurant servers (Conlin, Lynn & 
O’Donoghue, 2003; Lynn & McCall, 2000a). In addition, average tips are higher for 
servers with more positive service attitudes (Lynn, 2003; Lynn, Kwortnik & Sturman, 
2011). The effects of customer service ratings on restaurant tip percentages are neither 
mediated or moderated by patronage frequency so they cannot be attributed to a tendency 
for frequent patrons to both rate the service highly and leave larger tips or to a tendency 
for servers to give better service to those frequent patrons known to be generous tippers 
(Lynn & McCall, 2000a). Furthermore, customers’ service ratings are related to 
restaurant tip percentages in within-subjects as well as between-subjects analyses, so this 
service-tipping relationship cannot be attributed to individual differences in consumer 
empathy, generosity or other traits that might affect both service ratings and tip amounts 
(Lynn & Sturman, 2010; Lynn, Patrick & Kim, 2012).  
 Taken as a whole, the evidence that tippers are motivated by a desire to reward 
servers for the services they provide is reasonably strong. However, the observed effects 
of service on tipping tend to be small, whether examined within or between subjects 
(Lynn & Sturman, 2010) and whether examined at the service-encounter, server, or 
service-establishment levels of analysis (Lynn, 2003). For example, variations in 
customer’s perceptions of service quality account for only about five percent of the 
variance in tip percentages left by different dining parties in a restaurant (Lynn & 
McCall, 2000a). Thus, it appears that desires to reward service provide only a partial and 
very limited explanation for tipping.  
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3.3. Gain Preferential Service or Keep Normal Service  
 If tipping is motivated in part by a desire to gain preferential service or to keep 
normal service in the future, then variables that affect the likelihood of future service 
from particular providers should affect tipping. One possibility is that tippers assume 
servers are only motivated by rational economic self-interest. In that case, tippers 
interested in future service should vary tips with service quality in order to provide 
servers who are aware of the contingency with a rational reason to deliver better service. 
Since frequent patrons are more concerned than infrequent patrons with future service, 
patronage frequency should strengthen this tendency to vary tips with service quality 
(Ben-Zion and Karni, 1977; Lynn and Grassman, 1990). However, empirical research in 
restaurant contexts has repeatedly found that patronage frequency does not moderate the 
service-tipping relationship (Azar, 2007a; Lynn & McCall, 2000a), so either tippers are 
not motivated by concerns about future service or they pursue strategies for improving 
future service that do not assume servers are exclusively motivated by rational economic 
self-interest.  
A second possibility is that tippers assume servers are motivated to reciprocate 
past favors. In that case, tippers interested in preferential future service should tip 
generously regardless of current service quality in order to obligate the server to 
reciprocate with good service next time (Frank, 1988; Sisk and Gallick, 1985). Since 
frequent patrons are more likely to be concerned about future service, the strategy of 
obligating servers with generosity should make them particularly generous tippers. 
Consistent with this reasoning, numerous studies of restaurant tipping have found that 
frequent patrons do tip more than infrequent ones (Conlin, Lynn & O’Donoghue, 2003; 
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Lynn & McCall, 2000a). Unfortunately, however, this finding does not provide definitive 
evidence that desires for preferential, future service motivate tipping.  Frequent restaurant 
patrons could also tip more than infrequent ones because  they have greater incomes 
(Azar, 2010), satisfaction with the restaurant (Lynn & McCall, 2000a), concern about the 
server’s opinion of them (Lynn & Grassman, 1990), and/or empathy for, and resulting 
desire to help, servers (Lynn, 2006).  
Data reported by Conlin, Lynn and O’Donoghue (2003) help to rule out the first 
two of these alternative explanations, because they found a significant, positive patronage 
frequency effect on tip percentages after controlling for frequency of patronizing other 
restaurants (a proxy for income) and tipper ratings of the food and service quality. 
However, the ideas that patronage frequency effects on tipping may reflect a greater 
concern among frequent than infrequent patrons about the server’s opinion of them 
and/or a greater empathy for the servers cannot be ruled out with existing data.   Future 
research should test between these competing “future service,” “server approval,” and 
“empathy” explanations for patronage frequency effects on tipping. 
3.4. Gain or Keep Social Esteem 
If people tip to make or keep a favorable impression on others, then tip amounts 
should be positively related to individual and situational factors that affect (i) perceptions 
of others’ expectations about the appropriate tip amount, and (ii) the salience or 
importance of others’ esteem. Consistent with the influence of perceived expectations, 
dollar tips increase with bill sizes in U.S. restaurants as called for by the 15 to 20 percent 
tipping norm.  In fact, bill size is the single largest predictor of restaurant tip amounts in 
the U.S. -- with an average R2 of .70, it accounts for twice as much of the variability in 
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dollar tips as all other factors combined (Lynn & McCall, 2000b)! Furthermore, this 
relationship is stronger under conditions likely to enhance concern with the server’s 
esteem – i.e., it is stronger among frequent than infrequent patrons and at expensive than 
inexpensive restaurants (Lynn & McCall, 2000b).   
Also supporting the influence of perceived expectations, consumers’ tip sizes in 
U.S. restaurants are strongly related to their perceptions of the amounts people are 
expected to tip and consumers’ frequencies of tipping a variety of other service providers 
(e.g., bartenders, hair cutters, parking valets, pizza delivery drivers, and taxicab drivers) 
are strongly related to their perceptions that such tips are normative and expected (Lynn, 
2011). People could comply with social expectations because they have internalized those 
expectations and the internalization of the restaurant tipping norm could be more likely 
among frequent restaurant diners and affluent consumers, so the effects of perceived 
tipping norms and of bill size and its interactions with patronage frequency and restaurant 
expensiveness need not reflect tippers’ efforts to gain or keep social esteem, but they are 
consistent with such motives and efforts. 
Some support for the idea that the importance of others’ esteem affects tipping is 
provided by the positive effects of patronage frequency, knowledge of the server’s name, 
previous experience working for tips, and physical proximity to the server that were 
discussed in a previous section. Adding to this support, other studies have found that tip 
amounts increase with the servers’: 
1) calling the customer by name (Rodrigue, 1999; Seiter & Weger, 2013),  
2) membership in the majority (white) racial group (Ayres, Vars & Zakariya, 2005; 
Lynn, et. al., 2008),  
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3) physical attractiveness (Gueguen, 2012; Gueguen & Jacob, 2011; Lynn & 
Simons, 2000), and  
4) being the opposite sex of the customer (Lynn, Giebelhausen, Garcia, Li & 
Patumanon, 2013; Lynn & McCall, 2000b).   
All of these factors should increase the value of the server’s esteem and all have been 
found to increase tips, so they are consistent with the idea that tipping is motivated in part 
by a desire to get and keep the esteem of others.  
3.5. Fulfill Obligation 
If people tip to satisfy a sense of duty or obligation stemming from the 
internalization of tipping norms, then they should comply with those norms. As 
previously discussed, evidence of such compliance is abundant (e.g., restaurant tips 
increase with bill size). However, this norm compliance does not prove the norms have 
been internalized, because norm compliance could also be motivated by desires to gain or 
keep social esteem. Stronger support for the internalization of tipping norms would be 
provided by evidence that: (i) people comply with those norms even after eliminating or 
controlling for social pressures to comply, and (ii) situational and individual differences 
variables that affect the motivation to do one’s duty in turn affect compliance with those 
norms. Unfortunately, empirical tests of these effects are not available. This is another 
important area for future research to explore. 
3.6. Save Money 
 If tipping is constrained by people’s desire to save money for other uses, then 
situational and individual differences in concern with saving money or using it for other 
purposes should reduce the likelihood of tipping and should reduce tip sizes when tips are 
23 
 
left. Assuming that concern with costs decline with income, then these expectations are 
supported by research finding that the frequency and size of tips increase with the tippers’ 
incomes (Lynn, 2009; Lynn, Pugh & Williams, 2012).  
Less consistent with expectations is research examining the linear and quadratic 
effects of bill size on dollar tip amounts.  Dollar tip amounts generally increase with bill 
size, because tipping norms often call for tipping a percentage of the bill. Since the costs 
of tipping a percentage of the bill increases with bill size, cost-conscious consumers 
should increase their dollar tip amounts with bill size at a marginally deceasing rate as 
bill size increases. Contrary to this expectation, however, researchers have failed to find a 
negative quadratic effect of bill size on dollar tip amounts across a large variety of 
restaurants and other service settings (Lynn & McCall, 2000b; Lynn & Sturman, 2003).1 
These null results seem inconsistent with the idea that people are concerned about the 
costs of tipping, but it is possible that people’s self-selection of bill sizes undermines the 
expected negative quadratic trend. That is, price-consciousness may increase with bill 
size but that increase may be hidden by the tendency of less price-conscious consumers to 
have larger bills than do more price-conscious consumers. Thus, the existing cross 
sectional research on the quadratic effect of bill size on dollar tip amounts is 
inconclusive. Future researchers should test the effects of cost concerns on tipping by 
examining the quadratic effect of bill size on dollar tips within subjects.  
 
 3.7. Treat Others as Equals 
1 Percentage tips do decline with bill size, but this is due to a positive intercept in the relationship between 
dollar tips and bill size rather than to a negative quadratic trend in that relationship (Lynn & Sturman, 
2003).  The positive intercept reflects a tendency for some people to tip a flat amount irrespective of bill 
size (Lynn & Sturman, 2003) and/or a tendency for people to round tip amounts up to the nearest whole 
dollar amount (Azar, 2007) and says nothing about cost concerns as a constraint on tipping. 
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 If tipping is constrained by people’s desire to treat others as equals, then both the 
likelihood of tipping and tip sizes should be responsive to situational and individual 
differences in (i) the perception that tipping fosters status and power differences between 
servers and their customers, and (ii) the salience and/or importance of egalitarian values. 
Unfortunately, empirical tests of these expectations are not available. This is yet another 
important area for future research to explore. 
3.8. Summary 
 Research on the individual and situational determinants of tipping provides 
compelling, if not definitive, evidence that people tip in order to help servers, reward 
service, and gain or keep social-esteem as posited in the TMF. However, other aspects of 
the TMF have yet to be adequately tested.  
 
5. Occupational Differences in Who is and is not Tipped 
People tip some, but not all, service workers. In the U.S., for example, consumers 
generally tip bartenders, doormen, hair cutters, parking valets, restaurant servers and taxi 
drivers among others, but not accountants, car mechanics, dentists, flight attendants, 
lawyers, or teachers (Star, 1988). This raises a question about why some service 
occupations are tipped and others are not.   
The most prevalent economic explanation for occupational differences in tipping 
rests on the idea is that tipping exits because it improves economic efficiencies by 
reducing the costs of monitoring and rewarding server effort (Ben-Zion & Karni, 1977; 
Jacob & Page, 1980; Lynn, 2006).  This idea suggests that tipping will be more common 
among occupations providing more highly personalized and less technically complex 
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services that customers can monitor and reward more easily than can firms (Azar, 2005). 
However, this functional explanation for tipping has not been supported when empirically 
tested (Azar, 2005) and is unlikely to account for all occupational differences in tipping 
even if valid.   
The TMF suggests another potential explanation for why it is customary to tip 
some occupations and not others (see Table 3). The framework posits that tipping and the 
evolution of tipping norms are driven by a limited set of motivations, so tipping should be 
more common/normative for occupations whose characteristics evoke those motivations 
more consistently and strongly (see Azar, 2005, for similar ideas). More specifically, the 
framework suggests that the likelihood of tipping will be greater among occupations that 
involve:  
1) more frequent, repeated interactions between the server and customer, because 
repeated interactions should increase the customer’s need for future service, 
empathy with the server, and concern with the server’s esteem, 
2) closer and/or more prolonged interactions and relationships between the server 
and customer, because closer and more prolonged contact/relationships should 
increase the customer’s empathy with the server and concern with the server’s 
esteem, 
3) more envy evoking hedonic disparities between the server and customer, because 
fear of envy will increase the customer’s desire for the server’s goodwill/esteem, 
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4) more public interactions between the server and customer, because greater 
visibility of both service and tipping will increase the customer’s loss-avoidant 
motives for tipping,2 
5) lower server income relative to that of the customer, because perceived server 
need should increase the customer’s motivations to help the server, 
6) more individual and personalized service, because such “special” services are 
more worthy of pre-payment via tipping on prior service occasions and more 
likely to evoke the customer’s gratitude and motivation to reward the server, and 
7) more easily-evaluated service, because the ability to evaluate service should 
increase the customer’s ability and motivation to reward good service. 
__________________________________ 
insert Table 3 about here 
__________________________________ 
 
Existing research supports two of these TMF derived expectations about the effects of 
occupational characteristics on tipping.  Consistent with the second of the listed 
expectations above, researchers found that tipping is more prevalent for occupations 
involving face-to-face contact (Starbuck, 2009) and greater customer subjective closeness 
to the service worker (Azar, 2005).  Furthermore, consistent with the fifth of the listed 
expectations, they found that tipping is more prevalent for occupations with lower server 
incomes (Azar, 2005) and greater customer incomes (Azar, 2005; Starbuck, 2009). These 
2 Greater visibility of both service and tipping will make disparities between tippers and non-tippers in 
server esteem and service more apparent and this will fuel loss avoidant motivations among non-tippers 
even in the absence of strong tipping norms. Furthermore, greater visibility of tipping facilitates the 
identification and sanctioning of  non-tippers when strong tipping norms exist and are socially enforced.  
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findings add to the previously presented support for the ideas that tipping is motivated by 
desires to help servers and to gain or keep social esteem and they demonstrate the 
potential of the TMF to explain occupational differences in who is and is not tipped. 
In contrast to the supportive results presented above, Azar (2005) failed to find 
the expected relationship between the prevalence of tipping across occupations and the 
ease with which customers can evaluate the services provided by workers in those 
occupations. This null result combines with the very small effects of service quantity and 
quality on tip sizes reported previously to suggest that motivations to reward service are 
relatively minor determinants of tipping.  However, Azar’s study involved only 37 
occupations and only six judges’ opinions about how easily consumers could evaluate the 
services provided by members of those occupations, so his test has low statistical power 
and his measure of the independent variable is of uncertain reliability and validity. These 
methodological limitations mean that more research on this relationship is needed before 
any firm conclusions can be drawn about it.  
In summary, the TMF suggests that tipping will be more common and normative 
for occupations whose characteristics evoke stronger consumer motivations to leave tips. 
Consistent with this theoretical perspective, researchers have found that tipping is more 
common for occupations with closer and more prolonged customer-server interactions 
(which should increase the customer’s empathy with the server and concern with the 
server’s esteem) and greater income disparities between servers and their customers 
(which should increase perceived server need and the customer’s motivations to help the 
server).  However, the framework suggests many hypotheses about occupational 
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differences in tipping that have yet to be tested. Hopefully, researchers will test these 
hypotheses in future explorations of which occupations are and are not typically tipped. 
 
6. National Differences in Tipping Norms 
 Tipping norms vary across nations in terms of whom it is customary to tip and 
how much it is customary to tip them. For example, U.S. consumers routinely tip over 30 
different service providers while Icelandic consumers tip no one (Starr, 1988). 
Furthermore, consumers tip restaurant servers 10 to 15 percent of the bill in Canada but 
only leave 3 to 5 percent of the bill for restaurant servers in Switzerland (Starr, 1988).  
If, as the TMF posits, tipping and the evolution of tipping norms are driven by a limited 
set of motivations, then these national differences in tipping norms could stem from 
differences in their populations’ motivations to tip as explained below and summarized in 
Table 4.  
Motives that affect and predict individual and situational differences in tipping 
need not have the same relationship to tipping when both are measured at the national 
level of aggregation. Aggregation does not affect the variance in different variables to the 
same degree, so the co-variation between variables can be different at different levels of 
aggregation (Ostroff, 1993). Nevertheless, holding other factors constant, the stronger 
and more widespread within a population are individuals’ motivations to tip, the more 
common tipping should be within that population and (for acquisitive, but not avoidant, 
motives) the larger should be the amounts tipped within that population. Thus, national 
differences in the average strength of consumers’ motivations to tip could explain 
national differences in tipping behavior and norms.  
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 National differences in the motivation to tip may come from differences in the 
strength of general motives and/or from differences in perceptions and beliefs connecting 
those general motives with tipping. Therefore, the TMF suggests that the national 
prevalence of tipping and/or customary tip amounts should increase with the national 
population’s: 
1) level of altruism/empathy and perception of service workers as needing and 
deserving help, 
2) tendency toward reciprocity and perception that money (as opposed to social 
approval or recognition) is an appropriate reward for service, 
3) desire for preferential service and perception that monetary incentives above and 
beyond contracted prices (tips) are an appropriate and effective way to gain 
preferential service, and 
4) desire for social approval, liking and/or status and perception that others’ esteem 
depends on tipping.3  
In addition, the TMF suggests that the national prevalence of tipping and/or 
customary tip amounts should decrease with the national population’s: 
1) level of cost-consciousness, and 
2) level of egalitarianism and perception that tipping fosters  inequality between 
servers and their customers. 
__________________________________ 
insert Table 4 about here 
__________________________________ 
3 A sense of duty to tip comes from the internalization of tipping norms, so national differences in felt 
personal obligation to tip cannot help to explain the original development of those norms.  
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Few direct measures of the national constructs listed above are available. I have 
found no direct measures of national differences in altruism/empathy, perceptions that 
servers’ are needing and deserving of financial help, reciprocity motivation, perception 
that money is an appropriate reward for service, desire for preferential service, per 
caption that monetary incentives above and beyond contracted prices (tips) are an 
appropriate and effective way to gain preferential service, perception that others’ esteem 
depends on tipping, cost-consciousness, or perception that tipping fosters inequality 
between servers and their customers. Of the constructs mentioned above, only aggregate 
desires for social recognition/esteem and cultural egalitarianism have been directly 
measured. The effects of both variables support the TMF explanation of national 
differences in tipping.  
First, Lynn (1997) found that separate measures of national desires for social 
recognition and esteem were both strongly, positively related to the prevalence of tipping. 
In addition, Lynn and other researchers have found that several other national measures 
conceptually related to status seeking – masculinity, monumentalism, and need for 
achievement – are positively correlated with the national prevalence of tipping and/or 
customary tip amounts (Lynn & Lynn, 2004; Lynn, Zinkhan & Harris, 1993; Minkov, 
2008; Starbuck, 2009). Thus, the idea that national tipping customs reflect differences in 
the desire for social esteem has reasonably strong support.  
Second, Lynn, Zinkhan and Harris (1993) found that tipping is more prevalent in 
nations whose cultures regard power and status differences as natural and good.  Thus, 
the idea that national tipping customs reflect differences in egalitarianism also has 
empirical support. The national acceptance of power differences is unrelated to 
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customary tip sizes (Lynn & Lynn, 2004), but this is not surprising because the individual 
level effect of egalitarianism on tip size is difficult to predict. Some egalitarians may tip 
smaller amounts than others because they dislike tipping while others may tip larger 
amounts than others when leaving tips because they perceive small tips as more 
demeaning than large ones. 
Although direct measures of the other national constructs are not available, 
researchers have examined the relationships to tipping of reasonable proxies for at least 
two of those other constructs. First, researchers have found that the prevalence of tipping 
and customary tip amounts are negatively related to national psychoticism scores (Lynn, 
2000, 2008).  Psychoticism reflects the extent to which people are anti-social, egocentric, 
tough-minded and empathetic (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985), so it is a reasonable 
(inversed) proxy for altrusim/empathy.4 Thus, the negative effects of national 
psychoticism on national tipping customs provide some support for the idea that those 
customs depend on the altruism/empathy of national populations.  
Second, researchers have found that national levels of bribery are positively 
related to both the prevalence of tipping and the customary size of restaurant tips 
(Starbuck, 2009; Torfason, Flynn & Kupor, 2013). Arguably, the extent of bribery in a 
nation is a reasonable proxy for national perceptions that monetary incentives above and 
beyond contracted prices are an appropriate and effective way of gaining preferential 
service – the more common bribery is the more people are likely to perceive such 
payments as appropriate and effective. Thus, the effects of national bribery may reflect 
4 Lynn (2008) reported that psychoticism was unrelated to expressed desires to help servers at the 
individual level of analysis, but that null results seems anomalous given the literature on this trait and is 
difficult to explain or interpret.  
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national differences in the use of tips to buy preferential future service. If so, national 
bribery effects should be attenuated among occupations, like taxicab drivers, for which 
server-customer interactions are unlikely to be repeated. Consistent with this expectation, 
Starbuck (2009) found that national bribery was positively correlated with restaurant 
tipping rates, but not with taxicab tipping rates (r2’s = .19 and .002 respectively). Single 
studies cannot provide definitive evidence, but these findings support the idea that 
national differences in tipping customs partially reflect differences in the use of tips to 
buy preferential service in future encounters with the service provider.   
In summary, the TMF can be used to explain national differences in tipping norms 
as reflections of differences in consumers’ motivations to tip.  Consistent with this 
theoretical perspective, researchers have found that tipping is more prevalent in nations 
with stronger desires for status and recognition, weaker egalitarian values, stronger 
altruism/empathy (as reflected in psychoticism scores), and stronger motivations to buy 
future service with tips (as reflected in the prevalence of bribery). Importantly, many 
testable expectations derived from the framework have yet to be tested. Thus, the TMF 
should prove helpful to researchers in future explorations of national differences in 
tipping. 
7. Conclusions 
 Consumers routinely leave voluntary sums of money for service workers who 
have served them, even when they do not expect to encounter the service provider again. 
This behavior has attracted the attention of economists and other social scientists, but 
their work on the topic is spread across multiple disciplines and typically uses tipping as 
a context in which to test hypotheses and theories about other phenonema, such as 
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altruism (Gueguen, 2013), alcohol induced myopia (Lynn, 1988), diffusion of 
responsibility (Freeman, Walker, Borden and Latane, 1975), and consumer racial 
discrimination (Ayres, Vars and Zakariya, 2005). A few scholars have begun to focus on 
tipping in its own right by developing and testing theories about whether or not people tip 
to buy future service (Azar 2007a), whether or not tipping improves economic efficiency 
(Azar, 2005; Conlin, Lynn and O’Donogue, 2003), and whether or not tipping norms can 
persist if the only motivation for complying with them is to avoid disapproval (Azar, 
2004a), but even this work tends to be isolated and narrow in scope. There is no explicitly 
articulated theory or framework that can be used to (1) integrate the tipping literature, (2) 
explain historical, individual, situational, occupational and national variations in tipping, 
and (3) direct future research on the phenomenon. This paper fills that gap.     
Drawing upon the broader social-science and behavioral-economic literatures, I 
provide a framework of five motives for tipping and two motives for not tipping that I 
call the Tipping Motives Framework (TMF).  Specifically, I theorize that tipping is 
primarily motivated by consumers’ desires for the servers’ welfare, equitable 
relationships with servers, preferential future service, social esteem 
(approval/status/liking), and the fulfillment of social obligation/duty and that these 
positive motivations for tipping are opposed by a desire to keep the tip money for other 
uses and a dislike of the status differences implied and created by tipping. This 
framework goes beyond traditional models of homo-economicus by expanding the 
consumer’s utility function to include psychological as well as economic benefits, but 
such an expansion of the consumer’s utility function has precedent in other behavioral 
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economic work and is consistent with theory and research in other social and behavioral 
sciences.  
The TMF directly explains only why people do and do not tip. However, the 
framework can be combined with other assumptions and/or theories to generate plausible 
and testable explanations for: (1) how tipping norms came into existence and evolve over 
time, (2) why tipping varies across individuals and situations, (3) why tipping is more 
common for some occupations than others, and (4) why tipping varies across nations. 
Tables 1 thru 4 summarize the hypotheses developed in this paper, but they are by no 
means exhaustive. Additional hypotheses involving other variables or involving 
moderators of some of the hypothesized relationships can easily be generated from the 
marriage of the TMF with other assumptions and/or theories. For example, regulatory 
focus theory suggests that a promotion or acquisitive focus leads to maximizing behavior 
while a prevention or avoidance focus leads to satisfying behavior Shah & Higgins, 
1997). Combining this theory with the TMF suggests that stronger desires to help servers, 
reward service, gain future preferential service, and gain social esteem (approval, status, 
and/or liking) will increase both tipping likelihood and tip sizes while stronger desires to 
avoid guilt and avoid loss of accustomed service and/or social esteem will increase 
tipping likelihood but not tip size.   
The review of the tipping literature in sections 3 thru 6 provided meaningful 
support for the explanatory value of the TMF and illustrated its ability to integrate much 
of that literature. The review also showed that many important hypotheses about tipping 
have yet to be empirically tested and, thus, demonstrated the TMF’s utility as a guide for 
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future research on the topic. Economists have long been puzzled by tipping. Now they 



















Table 1. Application of the TMF to the origin and evolution of tipping norms. 
 
Proposition 1: The motives for tipping expand over time as more and more 
people begin to tip. Tipping begins as an attempt to help servers, reward 
good service, increase social status, and secure preferential future service. 
Once a few people begin to tip, they serve as models that similarly 
motivated others begin to copy. These early tippers create negative 
externalities for others who must begin tipping to avoid losses of service 
and server esteem. This loss avoidant motivation for tipping grows with the 
number of tippers in a positive feedback loop and can result in enough 
people tipping that non-tippers are seen as deviant and are looked down 
upon. Eventually, this public sentiment against non-tippers is codified in 






H1: Desires to help servers, reward good service, increase social status, and 
secure preferential future service will be described and/or implied as 
motives for tipping very early in the history of public writing and discourse 
on this behavior. 
 
untested 
H2: Desires to help servers, reward good service, increase social status, and 
secure preferential future service will motivate tipping for frequently and 
infrequently tipped occupations alike.  
 
untested 
H3: Concerns about avoiding loss of status and future-service will be 
described and/or implied as motives for tipping only later in the history of 
public writing and discourse on this behavior – after the behavior has 
become moderately common.  
 
untested 
H4: Concerns about avoiding loss of status and future-service will motivate 
tipping only for occupations that a sizeable minority or more of people tip.  
 
untested 
H5: A social obligation to tip will be described and/or implied only very 
late in the history of public writing and discourse on this behavior – after 
the behavior is more common than not.  
 
untested 
H6: A sense of obligation will motivate tipping only for occupations that a 
majority of people tip. 
 
untested 







Table 2. Application of the TMF to individual and situational differences in tipping. 
 
Proposition 2: Tipping will co-vary with individual and situational variables 
that affect consumers’ desires to help servers, reward service, gain or 
maintain future preferential service, gain or maintain social esteem, fulfill 





H8: Tipping will increase with individual differences in altruistic 
motivation when servers are perceived as needing and deserving help. 
 
supported 
H9: Customers’ patronage frequency, experience working for tips, 
knowledge of the server’s name, and physical proximity to the server will 
increase tipping through their enhancement of customer empathy with the 
server.   
 
untested 








H12: Service quantity and quality will increase tipping more for frequent 




H13: Customers’ patronage frequency will increase their tips through its 
enhancement of concern about future service. 
 
untested 
H14: Perceptions that tipping is normative/expected will increase tipping 
more for frequent patrons than for infrequent ones. 
 
untested 
H15: Bill size will increase restaurant tips more the greater the customers’ 
concern with the servers’ approval/esteem (e.g., for frequent patrons more 
than infrequent ones and at upscale restaurants more than downscale ones). 
 
supported 
H16: Customers’ patronage frequency, experience working for tips, 
knowledge of the server’s name, and physical proximity to the server will 
increase tipping through their enhancement of customer desire for the 
servers’ approval/esteem.   
 
untested 
H17: Servers’ physical attractiveness, sex, race/ethnicity, and use of 
customers’ names will increase tipping through their enhancement of 
customer desire for the servers’ approval/esteem.   
 
untested 
H18: Tipping will increase with individual differences in desires to fulfill untested 
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felt obligations/duties when injunctive norms call for tipping.  
 
H19: Bill size will increase restaurant tips even after controlling for the 
tippers’ desire for the server’s and others’ esteem. 
 
untested 
H20: Bill size will increase restaurant tips more the stronger the customer’s 
feeling of obligation to tip. 
 
untested 
H21: Tipping will decrease with concern about saving money or using it for 
other purposes (e.g., with lower consumer income). 
 
supported 





H23: Tipping will decrease with individual differences in egalitarianism 
when tipping is seen as fostering status and power differences between 













Table 3. Application of the TMF to occupational differences in tipping. 
 
Proposition 3: Tipping will be more common/normative for occupations 
whose characteristics more consistently and strongly evoke desires to help 
servers, reward service, gain or maintain future preferential service, and/or 





H24: The likelihood of tipping will be greater among occupations that 




H25: The likelihood of tipping will be greater among occupations that 
involve closer and/or more prolonged interactions and relationships 
between the server and customer. 
 
supported 
H26: The likelihood of tipping will be greater among occupations that 




H27: The likelihood of tipping will be greater among occupations that 
involve more public interactions between the server and customer. 
 
untested 
H28: The likelihood of tipping will be greater among occupations that 
involve lower server income relative to that of the customer. 
 
supported 
H29: The likelihood of tipping will be greater among occupations that 
involve more individual and personalized service. 
 
untested 
H30: The likelihood of tipping will be greater among occupations that 









Table 4. Application of the TMF to national differences in tipping. 
 
Proposition 4: Tipping will be more common/normative for nations whose 
populations more consistently and strongly want to help servers, reward 
service, gain or keep future preferential service, and/or gain or keep servers’ 
esteem as well as those whose populations less strongly want to save money 





H31: The prevalence of tipping and/or customary tip amounts should 
increase with the national population’s level of altruism/empathy and 




H32: The prevalence of tipping and/or customary tip amounts should 
increase with the national population’s tendency toward reciprocity and 
perception that money (as opposed to social approval or recognition) is an 
appropriate reward for service. 
 
untested 
H33: The prevalence of tipping and/or customary tip amounts should 
increase with the national population’s desire for preferential service and 
perception that monetary incentives above and beyond contracted prices 




H34: The prevalence of tipping and/or customary tip amounts should 
increase with the national population’s desire for social approval, liking 
and/or status and perception that others’ esteem depends on tipping. 
 
supported 
H35: The prevalence of tipping and/or customary tip amounts should 
decrease with the national population’s level of cost-consciousness. 
 
untested 
H36: The prevalence of tipping and/or customary tip amounts should 
decrease with the national population’s level of egalitarianism and 
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